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Abstract 
Usage of wireless networks among the users is apparently high. But, efficiency of the network gets decreased because of the 
challenges in the network. In proxy mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6), the message exchange for location update by any mobile device 
is established in centralized environment. Here, the messages are sent and received through local mobility anchor with 
centralized feature. As a result, there is devastating traffic at local mobility anchor which increases the cost of network. 
Also, the location update in distributed mobility environment is vulnerable to attacks such as false binding update, man-in-
the-middle, replay attack etc. Therefore, the development of location update scheme necessitates the security enhancement 
and reduction in cost. Hence, the present paper proposes a new secure and efficient location update scheme using 
tokenization. It eliminates the additional message exchanges such as proxy binding update, binding query and 
acknowledgements between the hosts required in the earlier works. Here, the traffic overhead is controlled by distributing 
the token of mobile node with mobile access gateway in distributed mobility environment. The security of the proposed 
scheme is validated using AVISPA – a security model checker. Finally, the analysis of security and performance evaluation 
demonstrates that the proposed scheme shows better security and significant reduction in the cost of signaling messages and 
data packet delivery. 
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1. Introduction 
Now-a-days usage of various mobile access networks are tremendously increasing with the challenges in 
terms of the security threats and efficacy of the network [1]. Mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) is the standard 
protocol served people a lot, where the IP address of the device is associated with a particular network for 
connection and while moving to the other network a temporary IP address is opted by keeping the permanent IP 
address of its home network [2]. PMIPv6 is a standard procedure to solve the issues found in MIP. In MIP, 
handoff delay is high and software has to be upgraded for configuration [1-3]. To address this issue, the 
PMIPv6 network based mobility management emerges. Here, there is no need to alter the IP address of a 
mobile node (MN) when the network changes. In PMIPv6 environment as shown in Fig 1, MN is moving from 
its Mobility Anchor Gateway (MAG) to other MAG in the distributed network is called as handoff or handover. 
Here after the movement, the MN is assigned with a temporary address called Proxy Care-of Address (PCoA) 
and it sends to a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA). The process of updating the PCoA to LMA is known as Proxy 
Binding Update (PBU). After PBU, LMA updates its Binding Cache (BC). The MN can forward the data 
packet only through the registered MAG to Correspondent Node (CN) via LMA. Each data packets of other 
MN’s belong to this network has to propel through the same LMA since it is centralized.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Proxy mobile IPv6 – An overview 
In order to reduce data traffic and signaling cost during proxy binding update, localized routing scheme for 
location update was proposed [4-5]. But, here the network and security issues arise due to non-optimal path 
while routing the packets of PBU. Subsequently, a partially distributed PMIPv6 scheme for BU has been 
investigated [6] with the incorporation of LMA. However, this scheme causes single point of failure. 
Afterwards, a fully distributed PMIPv6 with the MAGs which are responsible for all binding update operations 
instead of LMA was introduced [8]. Nevertheless, the binding queries of fully distributed PMIPv6 are sent 
through multicasting technique to all MAGs by introducing high data traffic. In addition, it is not possible to 
prevent the devastating attacks such as replay, false binding update, man-in-the-middle and denial-of-service.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 discusses the related work. The detailed description 
of the proposed scheme is presented in section 3. In section 4, the security validation using AVISPA and 
security analysis are described. The performance evaluation is presented in section 5. Finally, the conclusion of 
the paper is discussed in section 6. 
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2. Related work 
Proxy Mobile IP by S. Gundavelli et al 2008 is transparent to MN and it is exploited with localized network 
in which the same IP address is used even if there is change in the network. Here, the mobility of the MN is 
traced by network entities and the network is responsible for managing IP mobility of the clientless MN, is the 
biggest advantage of PMIPv6. However, the communication between MN and CN is sent through LMA via 
MAG [3]. Here, the proxy binding update is done by MN’s MAG after MN gets registered with the respective 
MAG. The LMA maintains a cache that stores all proxy binding updates. Hence, data traffic and cost of delay 
is high due to centralized scheme if there is Single point of failure occurs. Subsequently, Liebsch et al 2011 
investigates the localized routing with an optimal path for communication. Here, the registration process is 
same as it is defined in traditional PMIPv6 [7]. After registration, the location update is performed after passing 
localized routing initiation packet to both MN and CN by LMA and localized routing acknowledgement by MN 
and CN to LMA. It is done to optimize the path between MN and CN by LMA. Later, the data traverse through 
MAG’s of CN to MAG’s of MN or vice-versa, without using LMA. In spite of this, data traffic overhead and 
non optimized path turns out. Because, before the message exchange the MAG’s of MN and CN exchanges 
LRI and LRA packets with MAG where there is non-optimal path and causes high signaling cost. 
  The partially distributed PMIPV6 by C.J. Bernardos, et al 2013 was proposed to reduce the signaling cost 
of packets. Conversely, the registration process is similar as PMIPv6 [6]. The MAG of CN sends proxy binding 
query operation to LMA to know the Proxy CoA of MN for further data delivery operations. Here, the proxy 
query acknowledgement is sent back by LMA that contains the proxy CoA of MN. During this operation, CN’s 
MAG necessitates to buffer the data packet to avoid packet loss. The data packet is then forwarded from CN-
MAG to MN via MN-MAG. Nevertheless, there is a single point of failure due to static LMA. Afterwards, 
Bernardos et al 2014 [6-8] was suggested the scheme for distributed PMIPV6. Here, the job of LMA is totally 
distributed to different MAGs in the network to avoid centralization. After the initial registration process, CN 
forwards the data packet to MN via MAG’s of CN and MN respectively. The above mentioned operation has 
been done via CN-MAG by multicasting Proxy Binding Query (PBQ) to all MAGs belonging to the same 
domain of PMIP. The MAG of MN sends Proxy Query Acknowledgement (PQA) message to CN-MAG. In the 
course of time, CN-MAG buffers the data packets that are sent by CN to avoid packet loss and forward the data 
packet to MN-MAG and then to MN. Nevertheless, it imposes high signaling cost for control packets (proxy 
binding query operation) and also it suffers from denial-of-service attack. 
 Therefore, the present paper proposes a new location update scheme using tokenization scheme in 
distributed mobility environment to enhance security and efficiency in terms of significant reduction in 
signaling cost and latency. 
3. Proposed scheme 
3.1. Notations  
 The notations used in the proposed scheme are listed in Table 1. 
 
3.2. Detailed description of the proposed scheme 
 The entities involved in the proposed scheme are MN, MN-MAG, MAG, CN-MAG and CN. The 
initial registration process of MN with MAG is established as shown in Fig. 2. Subsequently, the PCoA and 
token of MN is assigned and MN-MAG then sends the token to all nearby MAGs present in the network. The 
MN frequently changes the position because of its mobility nature. Accordingly, the PCoA of MN should be 
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informed to CN for any message flow between CN and MN. Here, the token for the updated information on the 
movement of MN is distributed to all MAGs in the network through multicasting. The corresponding CN-MAG 
responds to the respective MN-MAG for the received token. Now, the CN sends the message to MN via 
MAG’s of MN. The message flow of the tokenized binding update scheme is consisting of the following steps, 
Step 1: MN registers initially in the home network with MAG. 
A unique token is shared between MN and MAG in the initial registration. 
 
Table 1. Notations used in the proposed scheme 
 
Symbols Descriptions 
PCoAMN Proxy care-of address of MN  
NMNMAG, NCNMAG, N’CN 
TMN 
TOKEN 
TOKENRES 
EPK-CN 
R0, R1 
σCN 
HASH 
|| and xor 
Nonces of MN-MAG and CN-MAG, new nonce of CN 
Token of MN 
Bit-pattern indicating the token generated 
Token response 
Encryption using CN’s public key 
Random number 
Digital signature by CN’s private key 
Hash function 
Concatenation and Exclusive-OR operation 
 
Step 2: MN-MAG distributes the token to all MAGs nearby in the network. 
MN-MAG ÆMAGs: M1 = EPK-CN{TOKEN || PCoAMN || NMNMAG}, xor(R0, NMNMAG) 
The message M1 is sent to all MAGs in the network and it is retrieved / decrypted by the respective 
correspondent node. Since the token of the MN (TOKEN) and PCoAMN is encrypted using public key of CN. 
Here, xor operation is performed between two random numbers R0 and nonce of MN-MAG, NMNMAG. After, 
performing xor operation a new random number is generated. The new random number is combined with the 
newly generated TOKENRES generated. 
Step 3: Verification of token by CN. 
The token is decrypted by the CN with its private key. Subsequently the decrypted token is searched for pre-
shared token in the cache of CN. If the token is found, the token response is generated. 
Step 4: CN sends the token response to MN via CN-MAG. 
CN Æ CN-MAG: M2 = EPK-MN{N’CN || TOKENRES || R1}, HASH(TOKENRES || N’CN). 
CN sends M2 to CN-MAG which contains TOKENRES, newly generated nonce of CN and random number 
R1. Here, R1 is computed using the xor operation with the nonce of MN-MAG and the random number R0 as 
mentioned in previous step. Subsequently, the response for the token TOKENRES is concatenated with the new 
nonce N’CN for hashing to be sent. 
Step 5: CN-MAG forwards the token response to MN-MAG. 
CN-MAG Æ MN-MAG: M3 = M2, NCNMAG, HASH(M2 || NCNMAG). 
Here, the token response is forwarded to the corresponding MN-MAG by CN-MAG with attaching its nonce 
and the hash value obtained for the concatenated values of M2 and NCNMAG. 
Step 6: MN receives the token response from MN-MAG. 
MN-MAG Æ MN: M4 = M3, NMNMAG, HASH(M3 || NMNMAG). 
 After receiving the token response from CN-MAG, MN-MAG forwards the token response to MN 
with its nonce NMNMAG and M3 along with the hashed value. 
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  Fig. 2. Architecture of the proposed tokenized binding update scheme 
Step 7: Transmission of data packet directly from CN to MN via MAGs. 
CN Æ MN: M5 = Data packet, σCN 
Finally, CN sends the data packet and digital signature directly to MN via MAGs.   
4.   Security validation and analysis 
 The current section discusses the security verification of the proposed binding update scheme using 
Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) model checker [9]. Also, the 
informal security analysis is discussed with existing binding update schemes. 
4.1. Formal Validation Using AVISPA 
The AVISPA provides the platform for verifying security properties of any protocol. Here, the protocol 
specification is written in High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL). Then, the HLPSL [9] is 
translated using a translator called hlpslif into a low-level format, known as Intermediate Format (IF). 
Subsequently, the IF is given to the following back-ends of AVISPA model checker for attack trace: (1) OFMC 
– On-the-fly model-checker [10] is used to implement efficient search heuristics, falsify protocols and intruders 
knowledge. Here falsify protocol and bounded session are performed by demand drive way. (2)  CLAtSe - 
Constraint-logic-based [11] attack searcher performs falsify protocols and bounded session are performed by 
constrain solving. These back-ends are useful to trace the sequence of events. The validation results of the 
HLPSL of the proposed scheme using AVISPA are as follows: (1) as shown in Fig 3 (a), OFMC checks the 
protocol with bounded number of sessions and summarized as safe. It shows that the number of visited nodes is 
2330, the search time is 3.55 seconds and the depth it reaches is 10 plies. (2) CL-AtSe traces the proposed 
protocol with bounded number of session using constrains solving as stated in Fig  3 (b) and summarizes the 
protocol as safe. Subsequently, the number of analyzed state is 1, reachable state is 1 and the translation time is 
0.06 seconds. 
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          Fig.  3. (a) OFMC back-end results;                               (b). CL-ATSE back-end results 
4.2. Data Integrity 
 Data integrity is to ensure the consistency of the data packet between the sender and the receiver [12]. 
The integrity of the data can be achieved using cryptographic hash functions.  In the proposed scheme, the 
integrity of the message is achieved during the control flows between the communicants. If an intruder tries to 
alter the token response (HASH(TOKENRES || N’CN)), the value  of the hash changes. Since the receiver first 
checks the hash value of the incoming packet. If the computed hash value matches with the received hash value 
then the packet is accepted else the packet is rejected. Thus, any modification in the message would not be 
possible for an intruder in the proposed scheme. 
4.3. Data Confidentiality 
The aim of data confidentiality provides privacy on the data exchanged between communicants. In the 
proposed scheme, it is achieved by applying asymmetric key encryption on token exchange and token response 
as cipher texts EPK-CN{TOKEN || PCoAMN || NMNMAG} and  EPK-MN{N’CN || TOKENRES || R1} respectively. Here, 
the confidentiality of token distribution and token response is encrypted using receiver’s public key. 
Consequently, the confidential messages of the proposed scheme can be decrypted using private key of the 
recipient which is not shared between the hosts. The intruder cannot recover the messages since the private key 
of recipient is kept secret. 
4.4. Authentication 
Authentication is a process of identifying the legitimate users of the network. It is provided by 
authentication functions such as cryptographic hash function, message authentication code and hash-based 
message authentication code. In the proposed scheme, the authentication is provided for the messages 
containing token exchanges and responses, EPK-CN{TOKEN || PCoAMN || NMNMAG}, xor(R0, NMNMAG) and EPK-
MN{N’CN || TOKENRES || R1}, HASH(TOKENRES || N’CN) respectively. Here, logical xor is performed with random 
number R0 and nonce of MN-MAG. The nonce and the random number cannot be recovered by the attacker 
since it is known only to the recipients of the communication. In addition, the hash function is also verified 
with the nonce of CN and TOKENRES for mutual authentication of MN and CN.  
4.5. False binding update attack prevention  
An attacker attempts to generate and send the false BU message to the recipient as the legitimate host [14]. 
However, the false BU attack is not possible in the proposed scheme. Here, the PCoA of MN is encrypted (EPK-
CN{TOKEN || PCoAMN || NMNMAG}) using the public key of CN and it is impossible to recover the private key of 
CN for the attacker to generate the bogus binding update.   
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4.6. Man-in-the-middle attack prevention 
An attacker monitors and injects the malicious messages in the channel between the participating principals, 
known as man-in-the-middle attack [15]. Here, the attacker maintains private connection between the 
communicants that makes the legitimate user to believe that they are communicating directly. It is prevented in 
the proposed scheme since the location update message is encrypted and the hash value is computed with the 
nonce of respective MAGs (M2, NCNMAG, HASH(M2 || NCNMAG)). Thus, the attacker cannot retrieve or intercept 
the messages shared between MAGs.  
4.7. Replay attack prevention 
The attacker intercepts the data and retransmits as a legitimate user is called replay attack. The prevention of 
replay attack is achieved through nonces. In the proposed scheme, the nonces (NMNMAG in step 2) are used for 
token distribution. In addition, the new nonce N’CN in step 4 is generated and updated at the side of recipient.  
5.  Performance evaluation 
In this current section, the performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed by comparing with the four 
existing PMIPs. In earlier works, the location update of MN is sent to LMA through MAG except fully 
distributed PMIPv6. In fully distributed PMIPv6, the location update is accomplished after multicasting the 
PBQ messages by CN. In our proposed scheme, multicasting of token is used for location update of MN. The 
total cost is computed based on initial registration of MN and location update in MAG and LMA of the 
network with respect to connection and data delivery cost [16]. The connection cost includes initial connection 
setup, cost required for control packets transmitted between host and MAGs/LMA and the cost for binding 
update in MAG and LMA [11]. The data delivery cost involves the size of data in terms of bits shared between 
the nodes and the cost of binding cache lookups by the MAG / LMA at the destination. 
 
Table 2. Variables used for performance evaluation 
 
Variables Description 
tm-l, tm-m Transmission time between MAG’s of CN and MN to LMA and 
MAGs respectively. 
dmm, dcm, dm-l, dm-m Transmissions cost and hop count of data transfer between MN to 
MN-MAG, CN to CN-MAG, MAGs to LMA, MAG of MN and 
CN to MAG respectively. 
  
In traditional PMIPv6, the MN initially registers with the MAG in the network and it acquires the 
proxy CoA and nonce. Let the initial setup cost be Csetup. Afterwards, it sends PBU to LMA via MAG and the 
cost for control packet (Cp) between MAG and LMA and vice-versa is denoted as, (Cp* 2tm-l). The connection 
cost of the conventional PMIPv6 (CCPMIP) is expressed as follows,  
CCPMIP = Csetup + (Cp * 2tm-l) + b log(nm * nh)                                                                              (1) 
where b is the cost for binding update at MAG or LMA and nm, nh are the number of MAGs present in the 
network and host per MAG respectively.  
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Subsequently, the CN sends data packet to the MN via MAG through LMA. The LMA then retrieves the 
location update of MN stored in the cache. Here, the cost for location update retrieval is represented as q log 
(nm * nh). The data delivery cost for traditional PMIPv6 (DCPMIP) is mathematically denoted as, 
DCPMIP = ds(dcm+2dm-l+dmm) + q log(nm *nh)                                                                             (2) 
where ds is the size of data packets exchanged between the nodes in bits. 
In localized routing for PMIPv6, the location update is forwarded to LMA after the initial registration of 
MN. The LRI packet is then sent to retrieve the optimal path between the hosts and the LMA and it sends LRA 
to MN and CN as acknowledgment. Accordingly, the connection cost for localized routing PMIPv6 (CCLR) is 
represented as follows, 
CCLR = Csetup + Cp(2tm-l) + b log(nm * nh) + Cp(4tm-l) + q log(nm * nh)                                                (3) 
The CN forwards the message packets to MN via the obtained optimal path. Thus, the ratio of LRI and LRA 
packet delivery time over the delivery time of data packet is measured as r. The data delivery cost of localized 
routing (DCLR) is expressed as, 
       DCLR =  (1- r)(ds(dcm + 2dm-l + dmm) + q log(nm * nh)) + r(ds(dcm + dm-l + dmm) + q log(nh))                  (4) 
where (1- r) is the delivery time of data before obtaining the optimal path. 
 In partially distributed PMIPv6, the MN sends the binding update to LMA via MAG after initial 
registration. The CN then sends proxy binding query to LMA to know the location update of MN. In response, 
the LMA sends the location update of MN to CN. The connection cost for partially distributed PMIPv6 (CCPD) 
is evaluated as, 
 CCPD = Csetup + Cp(4tm-l) + (b+q) log(nm * nh)                                                                            (5)  
Similarly, the data is delivered from CN to MN via MAG after the retrieval of MN’s location from LMA. 
Here, LMA performs binding cache lookup to retrieve the location of MN. Thus, the data delivery cost of 
partially distributed PMIPv6 (DCPD) is measured as, 
 DCPD = ds(dcm + 2dm-l + dmm) + q log nh                                                                   (6) 
In fully distributed PMIPv6, the CN distributes proxy binding query to all MAGs in the network after MN 
registers with MAG. Thus, the respective MAG of MN responses with the location update of MN. The 
connection cost of fully distributed PMIPv6 (CCFD) is represented as, 
CCFD = Csetup + Cp(2tm-m * nm) + (nm - 1)q log nh                                                                (7) 
After multicasting of PBQ by CN, the MAG of MN sends proxy query acknowledgment which contains the 
location update of respective node. Thus, the MAG of MN performs binding cache lookup to retrieve the 
address of MN. So, the data delivery cost of fully distributed PMIPv6 (DCFD) is obtained as, 
DCFD = ds(dcm + 2dm-m + dmm) + q log nh                                                    (8) 
In the proposed scheme, the MN initially registers with MAG. Subsequently, the token of MN is distributed 
to all MAGs in the network. Hence, the cost of token sharing is t (nm-1). Consequently, the token response is 
sent only by the respective CN via MAG. Since, the token of MN is pre-shared with CN. Here, the cost of 
token response by respective host is tr log nh. Thus, the connection cost of proposed scheme (CCPS) is 
mentioned as, 
 CCPS = Csetup + Cp(2tm-m) * nm+  t(nm-1)  + tr log nh                                                               (9) 
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Then, CN checks the cache for the location update of MN. So, CN forwards the message to MN via MAG. 
The data delivery cost of proposed scheme (DCPS) is as follows,  
 DCPS = ds(dcm+2dm-m+dmm) + q log nh                                                               (10) 
The Fig. 4 shows the comparison of number of host per MAG and transmission time between the existing 
schemes PMIPv6 (Gundavelli et al 2008), localized routing for PMIPv6 (Liebsch et al 2011), partially 
distributed PMIPv6 (CJ Bernardos et al 2013), fully distributed PMIPv6 (Bernardos et al 2014) and the 
proposed scheme. It exhibits that the cost of number of host is proportional to the binding updates and the 
cache lookup for finding the location of the MN. As shown in Fig. 4 (a), the scheme by Liebsch et al 2011 
consumes high connection cost when compared to conventional PMIPv6 due to exchange of additional packets 
(LRI and LRA) between hosts and LMA to obtain optimal route for further communication. However, the 
proposed scheme provides significant reduction in the total cost since additional control packets for binding 
update and cache lookups are eliminated. 
 
      
 
 
                   Fig. 4. (a) Comparison of total cost with respect to number of hosts per MAG; (b) Transmission time comparison 
                                                      
The Fig. 4 (b) depicts the comparison of transmission time required for binding update between existing 
schemes and the proposed scheme. Here, the scheme suggested by Liebsch et al 2011 illustrates the decrease in 
connection cost when compared with the scheme proposed by Bernardos et al 2014. Since, Liebsch et al 2011 
does not involve in multicasting of PBQ among MAGs to know the location of MN. However, the proposed 
scheme provides minimal transmission time because each time the host containing token only distributes the 
packet along with MAGs in the network. In addition, the token is encrypted using private key of the recipient, 
as a result the respective node only responds for the message sent. Here, the sharing of token provides 
optimized route for transmission of message or control packets between nodes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Fig. 5. (a) Comparison of total cost with packet size; (b) Comparison of total cost with respect to number of hops        
The Fig. 5 demonstrates the comparison of packet size and number of hops respectively. The least message 
size is provided in the proposed scheme when compared with other schemes as shown in Fig. 5 (a). Here, the 
scheme depicted by CJ Bernardos et al 2013 and fully distributed PMIPv6 establishes the same packet size 
since both performs PBQ operation to know the location of the MN. But, the proposed scheme requires least 
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packet size since the message of the PBU and PBA contains the shared token with the PCoA of MN rather than 
requesting for the location of the MN. 
The Fig. 5 (b) exhibits the minimal cost for the proposed scheme due to the control packets such as PBU, 
PBA, PBQ, PQA, LRI and LRA are evaded for location update with optimal message exchanges. Here, the 
connection cost for localized routing for PMIPv6 is same as partially distributed PMIPv6 since in localized 
routing PMIPv6, the control packets such as LRI and LRA is shared between hosts and LMA. Whereas, in 
partially distributed PMIPv6 PBQ is shared between the recipient and LMA. Conversely, the proposed scheme 
shows minimal connection cost because the control and message packets are not exchanged via LMA rather 
than MAGs of the host.                  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, an efficient and secure binding update scheme is proposed for identifying the location of MN 
using tokenization technique in distributed PMIPv6 environment. Here, the functionality of LMA is distributed 
among MAGs available in the network. In addition, the token is distributed to all MAGs for updating the PCoA 
of MN. The extra messages PBU and PBQ are avoided in the proposed scheme and resulting in reduced 
signaling cost and control packets. The security of the proposed scheme is verified using AVISPA. The 
performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme provides the significant reduction in latency of 
binding update. 
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